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STATE REVOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ 
LICENSES AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM* 
 
ROGER L. GOLDMAN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A traditional response to the intentional violation of a suspect’s 
constitutional rights by law enforcement officers has been federal criminal 
prosecution pursuant to the Civil Rights Act’s criminal conspiracy and color-
of-law provisions.1  A relatively new approach for dealing with serious police 
misconduct is revocation of the state-issued license or certificate that permits 
an officer to work in law enforcement within a state. The number of officers 
whose licenses are revoked increases each year, and the numbers are 
significant: the total number of officers whose licenses have been revoked for 
just cause in the eleven states that participate in a national database is over 
5,500.2  This article suggests ways that Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
Attorneys, particularly from the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division, 
and Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) handling criminal prosecutions 
against law enforcement officers could make use of state revocation practices.3  
This article also suggests that Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Commissions (“POSTs”), the state agencies responsible for revocation, make 
use of investigatory, grand jury, and other material gathered in preparation for 
federal prosecution by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
and AUSAs when POSTs pursue revocation. 
 
* The author thanks Professor Steven Puro for his valuable suggestions in the development of this 
article.  The author also wishes to thank Amanda Altman, Stephen Felson, Margaret McDermott, 
Matt Piant, Laura Schultz, and Matthew Waltz for their assistance in the preparation of this 
article. 
** Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945).  The criminal conspiracy statute is 18 
U.S.C. § 241 (2002).  The color-of-law provision is 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2002). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23. 
 3. Congress has a role in encouraging the states to adopt revocation laws and assisting the 
states in keeping track of officers whose licenses have been revoked.  See infra section II.B. 
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II.  STATE REVOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ LICENSES 
A. How Revocation Works in the States 
For most of our history, local police chiefs and sheriffs have handled issues 
of hiring and firing.  In the 1950s, however, the states began treating law 
enforcement as a profession, starting with setting minimum qualifications and 
training standards.  One of the hallmarks of a profession is that professionals 
must live up to certain standards; if they do not, they lose the privilege of 
practicing their professions.  Under current practice in most states, that process 
for law enforcement officers involves the revocation of an officer’s certificate 
or license issued by the state POST.4  To comply with constitutional norms, the 
officer is entitled to counsel and is given other due process protections, 
including, typically, a revocation hearing held before the POST or an 
administrative law judge.5  Unlike discharge from a local department, which 
would permit the officer to work for another department in the state, revocation 
prevents the officer from continuing to work in law enforcement in the state. 
As of March 2003, forty-four states have the authority to revoke the licenses of 
law enforcement officers.6 
Not surprisingly, revocation authority and practices vary from state to 
state.  What constitutes conduct sufficient to warrant revocation differs among 
the states: in some states, only conviction of felonies and misdemeanors 
 
 4. Revocation is the term used in most states; a few states use the terms “decertification,” 
“cancellation,” “annul,” and “recall.”  Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police 
Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 St. Louis U. L. J. 541, 543-44 
nn. 8-10 (2001) [hereinafter Revocation].  Many states can impose sanctions less serious than 
revocation, for example suspension of the license for a term of years.  N.D. Cent. Code § 12-63-
12(2001). 
  With a colleague from the Political Science Department, Professor Steven Puro, I have 
been writing about revocation for many years.  See, e.g., Revocation, supra; Steven Puro, Roger 
Goldman & William C. Smith, Police Decertification: Changing Patterns Among the States, 
1985-1995, 20 Policing 481 (1997); Steven Puro & Roger Goldman, Police Decertification: A 
Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 5 Police and Law Enforcement 115-16 (1987); Roger Goldman 
& Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional Remedies for Police 
Misconduct, 15 Hastings Cons. L. Q. 45-47 (1987). 
 5. The standard of proof for revocation is either clear and convincing evidence or a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See Revocation, supra note 4, at 553 nn.67-68. 
 6. For a citation to the laws, see Revocation, supra note 4, at 547 n.36.  The State of 
Washington enacted its revocation law after the publication of the article; the citation is WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 43.101.085 (2002).  The six states without revocation power are Hawaii, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.  For a discussion of the 
reasons why revocation has not been authorized in these states, see Revocation, supra note 4, at 
548 n.39. 
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involving moral turpitude will trigger revocation;7 in others, misconduct 
proven in an administrative hearing can result in revocation.8  Some states 
specifically target conduct involving civil rights violations and excessive 
force.9  States also differ in the type of law enforcement officers covered: in 
some states, only persons working as peace officers, like deputy sheriffs and 
police officers, are covered.10 In other states, both peace officers and 
correctional officers come within the agency’s jurisdiction.11  Oregon’s law 
covers even private security guards.12  In some states, the only sanction is 
permanent revocation; in others, suspension, reprimands, and other sanctions 
are permissible remedies. 
B. The United States and Revocation 
While regulation of peace officers is a state function, the federal 
government has long been concerned with policing issues.  Recent examples of 
this federal concern include civil and criminal statutes relating to police 
misconduct,13 and the provision of funding to the states for the hiring of 
 
 7. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-21-45 (1997 & Supp. 2000). 
 8. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 590.080 (West, WESTLAW current through the end of the 
2002 Reg. Sess.) (permitting discipline after a finding of cause by an administrative hearing 
commission). 
 9. See, e.g., S.D. ADMIN. R.  2:01:11:01 (2002) (conviction of a misdemeanor for conduct 
involving “interference with another’s civil rights”); MINN. R. 6700.1600 N (2000) (revocation is 
authorized for “engaging in sexual harassment” as defined by state law); N.M. ADMIN CODE, tit. 
10, § 29.1.11(5) (2000) (revokes for the commission of “acts of violence or brutality which 
indicate that the officer has abused the authority granted to him or her as a commissioned law 
enforcement officer”); in North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE  § 12-63-12 (2001) (authorizes 
revocation if the officer has “used unjustified deadly force in the performance of the duties as a 
peace officer”). 
 10. E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 590.010-.020 (West, WESTLAW current through the end of the 
2002 Reg. Sess.) (requiring license for peace officers, defined as law enforcement officers with 
the power of arrest). 
 11. E.g., Florida.  In fact, in 1999, more Florida correctional officers lost their licenses (186) 
than did peace officers (120).  Revocation, supra note 4, at 573 n.203. 
 12. In 1999, sixty private security guards had their licenses revoked in Oregon. Revocation, 
supra note 4, at 559 n.112. 
 13. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (criminalizes the intentional deprivation of citizens’ 
constitutional rights by law enforcement officers and others); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) 
(criminalizes civil rights conspiracies by two or more persons, including local, state, or federal 
officials); 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000) (authorizes the U.S. Att’y Gen. to bring a civil action for 
equitable and declaratory relief against a local police department to stop a pattern or practice of 
police misconduct). 
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additional law enforcement officers, pursuant to the Department of Justice’s 
Office of Community Policing Services (COPS) Program.14 
Congress could condition receipt of federal funding for local and state 
police agencies on the state’s establishment of an effective revocation 
program: the United States would then have a direct role in ensuring that the 
police departments it funds are not hiring officers with a record of previous 
misconduct.15  An analogous funding condition was applied by Congress to 
federal truth-in-sentencing grants.16 
Congress could also assist local law enforcement agencies and state POSTs 
by establishing a national databank to help prevent officers who lose their 
license in one state from becoming employed as police officers in another 
state.  Congress provided analogous assistance for the medical professions 
when it established the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).17  To support 
 
 14. In November 2001, President Bush signed a bill allocating $1.1 billion for the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), which provides funding for state and local law 
enforcement agencies.  See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, 762 (2001). 
 15. Were Congress to require a state to enact a revocation law under its Commerce Power, it 
would likely run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-
24, 933 (1991) (Congress could not require state and local law enforcement officers to conduct 
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers pursuant to the Commerce Power).  The 
federal interest in liberty and equality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and 
due process clauses permits Congress under section 5 of that Amendment to pass legislation 
protecting individuals from police misconduct by state and local law enforcement officers. Cf. 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66, 82, 90 (2000) (invalidating Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act as applied to states); University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 
374 (2001) (section 5 could not support damage suit under Americans with Disabilities Act 
brought by employee against state).  However, requiring the state to set up a program for 
revocation would likely be viewed as “commandeering” the state executive branch, prohibited by 
Printz.  The most appropriate constitutional source for such legislation would be Congress’ power 
to tax and spend for the general welfare.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Congress could condition 
the grant of COPS money on the state’s agreeing to set up a system of revocation, and this would 
seem to be permissible under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-06, 208 (1987) (upholding 
a condition that a state forfeits 5% of its federal highway funds if it permits persons under 21 to 
purchase alcoholic beverages on the grounds that the expenditure was related to the general 
welfare, the condition was made clear to the state, and the condition was related to the federal 
interest). 
 16. The Death in Custody Reporting Act conditions receipt by states of federal truth-in-
sentencing grants on reporting information regarding the death of persons arrested or in the 
custody of a state or local correctional facility.  Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2000, 42 
U.S.C. § 13704(a) (2000). 
 17. The NPDB was authorized under Part B of the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000). The NPDB requires reporting three types of information 
concerning professional conduct or competence of doctors, dentists, and other healthcare 
professionals: 1) state licensing boards have to report the removal of the doctor’s license or other 
public sanctions, § 11132; 2) health care entities, like hospitals and managed care organizations, 
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creation of the NPDB, the federal Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) 
undertook a study which found that in over one-third of the cases where a 
doctor had been licensed in more than one state, but had lost one license, the 
second state was unaware of the revocation.18  The GAO or the DOJ should 
undertake a similar study to determine if there is an analogous problem with 
law enforcement officers, because if Congress deems it important enough for 
the protection of the public to have a national databank on doctors and dentists 
whose licenses have been revoked or who have received other sanctions, it 
surely should consider doing so for law enforcement officers.19 
While there is no government-sponsored databank, the International 
Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training 
(IADLEST) has established a pilot National Decertification Database (NDD) 
that includes the names of officers whose certificates have been revoked for 
cause in eleven states.20  Presently, the database contains over 5,500 records21 
and is accessible to POST agency personnel in each state, whether or not they 
 
have to report the health care professional’s loss of staff privileges or other sanctions where the 
punishment lasts more than 30 days, § 11133; and 3) the payer of malpractice judgments or 
settlements is responsible for reporting information regarding the payment and its circumstances, 
both to the NPDB and the state licensing board, § 11131; 45 C.F.R. § 60.7.  The Act also 
provides qualified immunity for reporting.  42 U.S.C. § 11137 (2000) (“No person or entity . . . 
shall be held liable in any civil action with respect to any report made under this part . . . without 
knowledge of the falsity of the information contained in the report.”). 
 18. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SEC’Y OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, EXPANDED FEDERAL AUTHORITY NEEDED TO PROTECT MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
PATIENTS FROM HEALTH PRACTITIONERS WHO LOSE THEIR LICENSES 4 (1984). 
 19. The proposed Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act 
of 1996 would have established a registry at the DOJ that would have listed all criminal justice 
agencies for which an officer had worked and reported the fact that an officer’s license had been 
revoked.  H.R. 3263, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 484, 104th Cong. (1995). Unlike the NPDB, which 
includes the names of only those medical professionals who have received some kind of sanction, 
the registry would have listed the names of all law enforcement and correctional officers in the 
country.  This prompted Representative Schumer to say, “We have a list of every officer in the 
country.  When we’re concerned only about so-called rogue officers, why not just list the few bad 
officers?”  Police Officers’ Rights and Benefits: Hearing on H.R. 218, H.R. 878, H.R. 1805, H.R. 
29219, and H.R. 3263 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on  the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 37 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing].  Although there was a hearing on the bill in the 
House, it never made it out of committee.  See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov [hereinafter THOMAS]. 
 20. The eleven states that currently supply information to the NDD are: Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio and Texas.  E-mail from Ray Franklin, Operations Manager, NDD, to Roger L. Goldman, 
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law (Dec. 6, 2002) (on file with author). 
 21. Id. 
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are in one of the eleven states supplying information.22 The records date back 
as far as 1973.23  Unlike the NPDB, which is mandated by federal law, the 
NDD is a voluntary effort among the eleven states to track the movement of 
officers whose licenses have been revoked.24  One reason that the information 
kept on the NDD is much more limited than the NPDB is that there is no 
qualified immunity for reporting. 
III.  FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND 
STATE REVOCATION 
A. Background 
The number of law enforcement officers who either plead guilty to or are 
convicted of conspiracy and color-of-law violations in federal court is just a 
fraction of the total number of complaints filed against such officers each 
year—approximately 1% in fiscal year (“FY”) 2001, the most recent reporting 
year.25  Of the roughly 6000 complaints against law enforcement officers made 
to the DOJ in FY 2001,26 approximately 1000 were investigated by the FBI27 
 
 22. E-mail from Ray Franklin, Operations Manager, NDD, to Roger L. Goldman, Professor, 
Saint Louis University School of Law  (Sep. 17, 2002) (on file with author). 
 23. E-mail from Ray Franklin, Operations Manager, NDD, to Roger L. Goldman, Professor, 
Saint Louis University School of Law  (Nov. 4, 2002) (on file with author). 
 24. The American Bar Association oversees a similar voluntary data bank, the National 
Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, containing public discipline by state bar associations and state and 
federal courts.  CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL LAWYER 
REGULATORY DATA BANK, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/databank.html. 
 25. Steven Puro, Federal Responsibility for Police Accountability Through Criminal 
Prosecution, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 95, 111-12 (2003). 
 26. The number 6000 is a rough approximation based on the data that is available. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html (last visited Feb. 2003).  This web page states that of the 
approximately 12,000 criminal civil rights complaints filed annually the majority are against 
“officials,” including “state and local police officers, prison superintendents and correctional 
officers, federal law enforcement officers and state and county judges.”  Id.  The actual number of 
criminal, civil rights complaints filed with the Civil Rights Division in fiscal year 2001 was 12, 
438.  CRIMINAL SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF 
CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES (FY1985 - FY2001) (n.d.) [hereinafter SUMMARY], included in a 
facsimile from Albert N. Moskowitz, Chief, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file 
with author).  It is assumed that complaints against law enforcement officers make up the bulk of 
the complaints against “officials” since there are many more law enforcement officers than other 
types of officials listed.  Since the term “majority” refers to a number that is more than half of the 
total, it is assumed that after subtracting complaints against other “officials,” about half of the 
12,000 complaints are against law enforcement officers. 
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and only 100 or so resulted in federal prosecution.28  An unknown number of 
complaints are not acted upon by the federal government pursuant to the DOJ’s 
policy of deference to local or state agencies; the federal investigation is 
suspended once state or local criminal charges are filed.29 
In addition to deference to state or local prosecutions, other reasons for 
declining federal prosecution are:  lack of evidence of criminal intent by the 
officer; absence of a federal offense committed by the officer; and weak or 
insufficient admissible evidence against the officer.30  None of these reasons 
would necessarily prevent the officer from having his license revoked, 
depending on the particular state’s revocation law.  Therefore, where it is 
determined that a case should be declined as not presenting a viable federal 
case, consideration should be given to sending the file to the officer’s state 
POST for possible revocation.31 
 
 27. The number 1000 is an approximation based on the incorporation of data from two 
sources.  SUMMARY, supra note 26 (showing the total number of FBI investigations into criminal 
civil rights violations in fiscal year 2001 was 2241); Police Brutality, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Civil and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 7 (1991) 
(statement of William Baker, Asst. Dir., Criminal Div., FBI) (regarding civil rights matters, “the 
FBI places its highest priority on cases concerning police brutality, which comprise 50 percent of 
the civil rights inquiries that we initiate”).  Assuming “cases concerning police brutality” includes 
all cases opened against police officers, and that William Baker’s “50%,” id., is the exact 
percentage, the number of FBI investigations of police officers in fiscal FY 2001 was 1120.  
Because of the uncertainty in this calculation, 1000 is used as an approximation. 
 28. SUMMARY, supra note 26.  While in FY 2001 the total number of criminal, civil rights 
cases filed against law enforcement officers was 49, the total number of defendants was 97. 
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS RESOURCE MANUAL sec. 47 (Oct. 1997) 
[hereinafter CRRM], http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title8/ 
cvr00046.htm, also available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ 
title8/t8rm.wpd. 
Upon receipt of information by the FBI sufficient to justify initiation of a civil rights 
investigation, an investigation should be conducted regardless of the fact that a local or 
state investigation of the same incident is also being conducted. If, during the course of 
the FBI’s investigation, state or local criminal charges arising out of the incident are filed 
against the subject(s), the FBI’s investigation should be suspended and the United States 
Attorney and FBIHQ should be notified of the nature of the criminal charges and the 
likely timetable for prosecution of such charges. In all other situations, the investigation 
should continue to completion. 
Id. Where the state prosecution proceeds, “the local prosecutive effort is deemed to vindicate 
federal interests.” U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION 
OVERVIEW, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/overview.htm (stating that occasionally there may 
be a federal prosecution, despite the fact there was a preceding state prosecution). 
 30. Puro, supra note 25, at 100-02. 
 31. The sending of files to units outside the Criminal Section already occurs within the Civil 
Rights Division.  In police misconduct cases, among others, “the Criminal Section may refer 
complaints that do not present a criminal violation to other Sections or within the Civil Rights 
Division that have authority under separate civil statutes to file suit when a pattern of abuse is 
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In FY 2001, 56 officers pled guilty or were convicted of conspiracy or 
color-of-law violations, the most in any of the past fifteen years according to 
the Criminal Section’s Summary.32 Of those cases that did proceed to trial in 
FY 2001, 14 officers were convicted and 13 were acquitted, a 52% conviction 
rate.33  In contrast, in every case that went to trial against non-law enforcement 
civil rights defendants in both FY 2000 and FY 2001, 100% of the defendants 
were convicted.34  It appears that law enforcement defendants (and their 
lawyers) are aware of the difficulty of getting convictions as shown by the 
number of defendants choosing a trial rather than entering pleas: 51% of law 
enforcement defendants went to trial in FY 2000 and FY 2001,35 whereas only 
11% of non-law enforcement civil rights defendants went to trial during that 
time period.36  During FY 2000, for all federal criminal cases disposed of by a 
plea or judgment of acquittal or conviction (69,283 cases), only 6% of 
defendants went to trial, the remainder pleading guilty or nolo contendere.37 
Because of the difficulty of obtaining convictions against law enforcement 
officers in civil rights cases, a federal prosecutor needs to consider the 
consequences of proceeding to trial and having the officer acquitted by the jury 
as occurred in 41% of the cases (29 out of 70) in FY 2000 and FY 2001;38 the 
officer, in all likelihood, will be able to continue in law enforcement after the 
acquittal.  Had the prosecutor been able to reach an agreement with the 
defendant to dismiss the criminal charges in exchange for the officer’s giving 
up his state license, the officer would no longer have been able to work in law 
enforcement, at least within that state. 
B. Pretrial Diversion 
U.S. Attorneys have the discretion to choose not to prosecute a person but 
instead to divert the person into a program of supervision by the U.S. Probation 
Service for a period not to exceed eighteen months.39  This typically occurs 
 
discovered.”  CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL SECTION OVERVIEW, 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/overview.htm. 
 32. SUMMARY, supra note 26. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Another 10% of all federal defendants had their cases dismissed or nolle prossed.  
Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, at http://fjsrc.urban.org (statistic calculated out of 
database available at this website) (last revised June 18, 2002) (on file with author). 
 38. SUMMARY, supra note 26. 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-22.010 (1997) [hereinafter 
USAM]. 
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prior to charging, but may occur after the person has been charged.40  If the 
person complies with the conditions agreed to for a certain period of time, 
there will be no criminal charges filed.  If the person entered the program after 
charges were filed, they will be dismissed.  The offender must agree to waive 
his or her speedy trial rights and waive any statute of limitations defense.41  
The person need not admit guilt but must acknowledge responsibility for the 
behavior.42  “Innovative approaches are strongly encouraged,”43 suggesting 
that an agreement not to work in law enforcement, at least during the eighteen 
months of supervision, would be permissible. 
Two provisions of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (“Manual”) may limit the 
use of pretrial diversion for law enforcement officers: first, diversion is 
inappropriate for an individual who is “[a]ccused of an offense, which, under 
existing Department guidelines, should be diverted to the State for 
prosecution.”44  Second, pretrial diversion is inappropriate where the individual 
is “[a] public official or former public official accused of an offense arising out 
of an alleged violation of a public trust. . . .”45 Assuming a law enforcement 
officer is a “public official” and that anytime a law enforcement officer is 
criminally prosecuted for something he or she does while on the job is a 
violation of a “public trust,” pretrial diversion would not be an available 
option. 
C. The Charging Decision 
In charging a law enforcement officer, whether for conspiracy to violate 
the civil rights of a person under 18 U.S.C. § 241, or for intentionally 
depriving a person of constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242, or for any 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, sec. 712(B)(1) (Oct. 1997), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00712.htm. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at sec. 712(E). 
 44. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-22.100. 
 45. Id.  Similarly, the Manual treats defendants who are governmental officials differently 
from other defendants in the area of non-prosecution agreements with defendants in exchange for 
their cooperation in testifying against other defendants. For most defendants, such agreements are 
within the discretion of the AUSA and his or her supervisor, USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-
27.600A, but where the defendant is “[a] high-level Federal, state or local official” or “[a]n 
official or agent of a Federal investigative or law enforcement agency,” approval from the 
appropriate Assistant Attorney General is necessary, USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.640.  Thus, 
in a case involving multiple law enforcement officers as defendants, special permission must be 
obtained before negotiating non-prosecution agreements with any federal agent, regardless of 
rank, and with local police chiefs, sheriffs, and possibly with other command officers. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
130 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:121 
 
other federal criminal charge,46 the federal prosecutor should be well-versed in 
the revocation law in the state where the prosecution is brought; in some states, 
licenses are revoked only for felony convictions, while in others, some but not 
all misdemeanor convictions can result in revocation. 
The Manual has a section on Non-Criminal Alternatives to Prosecution, 
recognizing that, because Congress and state legislatures “have provided civil 
and administrative remedies for many types of conduct that may also be 
subject to criminal sanction,” criminal prosecution may not be the only 
appropriate response to serious misconduct.47  One suggested alternative 
response is the “reference of complaints to licensing authorities”48 such as the 
POSTs.  The Manual advises: “Attorneys for the government should 
familiarize themselves with these alternatives and should consider pursuing 
them . . . . Although on some occasions they should be pursued in addition to 
the criminal law procedures, on other occasions they can be expected to 
provide an effective substitute for criminal prosecution.”49 
D. Declining Prosecution50 
In setting forth the grounds for commencing or declining prosecution the 
Manual states that prosecution should be commenced if there exists a 
prosecutable case, unless: “1. No substantial Federal interest would be served 
by the prosecution; 2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another 
jurisdiction;51 or 3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to 
prosecution.”52  A prosecutable case is one in which the person will “probably 
 
 46. Law enforcement officers have been convicted of: RICO violations under 18 U.S.C.§ 
1962(c)-(d), U.S. v. McDonough, 959 F.2d 1137 (lst Cir. 1991); intent to facilitate an illegal 
gambling business under 18 U.S.C. § 1511, id; receiving an illegal gratuity under 18 U.S.C. § 
201(c)(1)(B), U.S. v Ahn, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C.Cir. 2000); conversion of evidence and victim 
restitution money under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), U.S. v. Suarez (6th Cir. 2001); perjury under 
18 U.S.C. § 1623, U.S. v. Radford, 2001 WL 857192 (6th Cir. 2001); accepting bribes under 18 
U.S.C. § 1951, U.S. v. Clark, 989 F.2d 447 (11th Cir. 1993); extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 
U.S. v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2001); and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 
1503, U.S. v. Conley, 249 F. 3d. 38 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 47. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.250. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The Manual provides that ultimate authority to decline cases arising under federal civil 
rights law resides with the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.  USAM, supra note 39, at 
§ 8-3.150. 
 51. See USAM, supra note 39, at § 8-3.170 (“Frequently, conduct which deprives persons of 
federally protected rights in violation of federal law also violates state law.  In such cases, where 
state and local authorities undertake vigorous prosecution in state courts, it is Department policy 
to cooperate fully with the local prosecutor.”). 
 52. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.220(A). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] STATE REVOCATION AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION 131 
 
be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.”53  The likelihood that the fact-
finder will acquit the defendant because of the unpopularity of some part of the 
case is not a factor against prosecution: “[I]n a civil rights case . . . it might be 
clear that the evidence of guilt—viewed objectively by an unbiased fact-
finder—would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, yet the 
prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury would convict.”54  The 
Manual indicates that the prosecutor may still conclude it is better to proceed.  
Thus, in a case against a law enforcement defendant, the prosecutor could 
proceed even if it is clear the jury will acquit because, for example, the victim 
of the constitutional violation would not be a sympathetic witness to the jury.  
The Manual’s preference for prosecution, even if an acquittal is likely, may be 
an attempt to show that the United States means business when it comes to 
prosecuting civil rights violators. 
On the other hand, the Manual permits the dropping of the federal charges 
if there is an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.  The factors to 
consider are: “1. The sanctions available under the alternative means of 
disposition; 2. The likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed; and 3. 
The effect of non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement interests.”55  
Thus, the Manual would permit the federal prosecutor to decline prosecution if 
assured that the state POST would permanently revoke the officer’s license. 
Thus, if an officer would be willing not to contest the license revocation, the 
federal prosecutor could agree to dismiss the charges, once notified that the 
license was revoked.56 
E. Plea Agreements 
Where possible, the prosecutor would want to negotiate a plea, in writing, 
prior to dismissal of the criminal charge or dropping the level of the charge,57 
in exchange for the defendant’s agreeing to the surrender of the state license.58 
 
 53. Id. at § 9-27.220(B). 
 54. Id. 
 55. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.250(A). 
 56. In effect, just such an agreement occurred when the Independent Counsel declined to 
prosecute President Clinton, waiting until after the Arkansas bar suspended his license for five 
years without a contest.  See CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 24. 
 57. Color of law violations under 18 U.S.C. § 242 constitute felonies where death or bodily 
injury is proven; otherwise, a violation is a misdemeanor.  18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000). 
 58. In April 1998, two New Jersey state troopers who stopped a van carrying four minority 
students to a college basketball tryout and fired 11 shots into the van pled guilty in state court to 
official misconduct and making false statements.  They were fined $280, gave up their jobs with 
the state police, and agreed not to work in New Jersey in any public position.  In exchange for 
their plea, they avoided jail time and the possibility of federal charges.  They also agreed to give 
details about racial profiling by the state police.  Angela Couloumbis, State Acts on Guilty 
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This practice already occurs in plea-bargaining with professionals such as 
doctors or lawyers who agree to give up their licenses in exchange for lowering 
or dismissing the criminal charges.59  In the revocation laws and regulations of 
two states, Texas60 and Ohio,61 officers are permitted to voluntarily surrender 
their licenses.  In Texas, between January 1997 and September 2000, there 
were 110 voluntary surrenders, 104 permanent, and six for a term of years.62  
The vast majority of voluntary surrenders in Texas are in the context of an 
actual or threatened criminal prosecution.63 
Especially in the six states that have no mechanism for revoking the 
license of an officer even after a felony conviction, the federal prosecutor 
should obtain such an agreement so that the defendant will not be able to return 
to law enforcement.64  The agreement should further provide that the defendant 
not seek a law enforcement license in any other state and that he waives the 
statute of limitations for bringing federal criminal charges should he violate the 
agreement.65  All of the U.S. courts of appeals that have considered the issue 
have held that the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional matter but an 
 
Troopers’ Remarks, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1.  New Jersey is one of the 
states that does not have a revocation statute. 
 59. Although he did not technically enter into a plea agreement, the Independent Counsel, 
Robert W. Ray, declined to prosecute President Clinton relating to his testimony about Monica 
Lewinsky, in part, because the President had agreed to a suspension of his Arkansas bar license 
for five years.  ROBERT W. RAY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, IN RE MADISON 
GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN ASS’N, REGARDING MONICA LEWINSKY AND OTHERS 20 (released 
Mar. 6, 2002), http://0-icreport.access.gpo.gov.library.csuhayward.edu/lewinsky.html. 
 60. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 223 (2000). 
 61. The POST Director has the power to revoke a certificate if the officer “[p]leads guilty to 
a misdemeanor. . .pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. . . in which the person agrees to 
surrender the certificate.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.77(F)(1)(b). 
 62. See Revocation, supra note 4, at 545 n.23. 
 63. E-mail from Raymond Winter, TX Office of the Att’y Gen., to Roger L. Goldman, 
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with author). 
 64. In the absence of a revocation statute, states vary on whether a person convicted of a 
felony may serve in law enforcement.  See Revocation, supra note 4, at 569-70.  The federal Gun 
Control Act of 1968 prohibits convicted felons from carrying a gun, but exempts, in many cases, 
state and federal law enforcement personnel under a “public interest exception,” 18 U.S.C. § 922 
(2002); however, there is no public interest exception where the officer has been convicted of a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2002). 
 65. Persons who wish to participate in the pretial diversion program must agree to give up 
their rights to object to unreasonable delay in the bringing of an indictment, information or 
complaint under Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as any objection 
under the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Provision and the relevant statutes of limitations “for 
a period of months equal to the period” of the agreement.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL, sec. 715 (Oct. 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
title9/crm00715.htm. 
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affirmative defense that may be waived by the defendant.66  The agreement 
should be sent to the NDD and be made available to all state POSTs. 
The Manual instructs the federal prosecutor to weigh all relevant 
considerations, including the seriousness of the offenses charged, the 
desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case, the likelihood of 
obtaining a conviction at trial, and the public interest in having the case tried 
rather than disposed of by a guilty plea.67 The Manual instructs the attorney to 
consult with the investigative agency (the FBI) and the victim for their views 
on these various factors.68  In favor of proceeding to trial is the fact that the 
case involves an alleged violation of constitutional rights and that justice is 
done by exposing the violation at a public trial; on the other hand, given the 
difficulty of obtaining convictions as compared with other civil rights cases 
handled by the Criminal Section, it might be better to reach an agreement with 
the defendant to stay out of law enforcement forever rather than risk an 
acquittal and a return to the field.69  Of course, a defendant may be unwilling to 
plead to a lesser charge or to give up his license in exchange for dropping all 
criminal charges; the point is that the federal prosecutor should be aware that 
the officer cannot remain in law enforcement without his state license.  While 
it is true, as discussed below, that a federal judge is unable to bar the defendant 
permanently from engaging in law enforcement, the federal prosecutor can do 
 
 66. United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Walsh, 700 
F.2d 846, 855 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3rd Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 
685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  The 6th 
and 10th circuits at one time had found that the statute of limitations was a jurisdictional bar, 
which may be raised at any time by a criminal defendant.  See Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 
99, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1960); Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964).  Benes 
has been limited to apply only when there has not been an express waiver of the statute of 
limitations.  United States v. Del Percio, 870 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1989).  Where there is no 
explicit waiver, the statute of limitations presents a bar to prosecution that may be raised for the 
first time on appeal. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 858 (6th Cir. 2000).  The 10th 
Circuit effectively overruled Waters in United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
 67. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.420(A). 
 68. Id. at § 9-16.030.  (This section notes that under the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982, P.L. 97-291, § 6, 96 Stat. 1256, there should be consultation with the appropriate federal 
investigative agency and consideration of the view of the victims in negotiating pleas.). 
 69. Cincinnati Police Officer Robert Jorg was charged with assault and involuntary 
manslaughter in the death of a suspect in a drug case, Roger Owensby, in November 2000.  He 
was acquitted on the assault charge and there was a hung jury on the manslaughter charge.  The 
county prosecutor declined to re-prosecute.  Jorg left the Cincinnati Department to become a 
police officer in Clermont County.  He also filed a $30 million federal lawsuit against city and 
county officials.  Gregory Korte, Coroner’s Review Verifies Owensby’s Cause Of Death, THE 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 13, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 20836698. 
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so through a plea agreement in which the officer agrees to have his license 
revoked and also agrees not to seek a license in any other state. 
F. Sentencing Recommendations 
If a criminal case goes to trial and results in a conviction rather than a plea 
agreement, the remedy is supplied through the sentence.  Sentencing is 
primarily the responsibility of the judiciary.  When imposing a sentence of 
probation70 or supervised release,71 the judge is authorized by the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to order the defendant to 
“refrain . . . from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession 
bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, 
or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a 
stated degree or under stated circumstances.”72 Federal prosecutors have a role 
to play at the sentencing stage of a case: “[T]he attorney for the government 
should assist the sentencing court by. . .making sentencing recommendations in 
appropriate cases.”73  This could include a recommendation that the officer 
refrain from engaging in law enforcement and not seek a license in another 
state while on probation or supervised release. 
The Manual instructs U.S. Attorneys to make recommendations with 
respect to a sentence when “[t]he public interest warrants an expression of the 
government’s view concerning the appropriate sentence.”74  However, since 
sentencing is primarily up to the judiciary, this should not be done routinely 
but should be reserved “for those unusual cases in which the public interest 
warrants” a recommendation.75  The Manual notes the value of the “imposition 
of innovative conditions of probation if consistent with the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”76  One possible condition of probation noted is that the defendant 
“desist from engaging in a particular type of business.”77 In determining the 
recommendation, one of the factors to consider is the extent to which the 
proposed sentence “protect[s] the public from further offenses by the 
defendant.”78  In most cases of police misconduct, a recommendation that the 
officer desist from serving in law enforcement would clearly be within the 
 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6) (2002). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2002). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) (2002) (probation); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2002) (supervised 
release). 
 73. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.710(A). 
 74. Id. at § 9-27.730(A)(2). 
 75. Id. at § 9-27.730(B)(3). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at § 9-27.740(B)(2). 
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public interest and would protect the public from further offenses of the same 
nature as the criminal conduct. 
With respect to the terms of probation, judges have broad sentencing 
discretion since they can require a defendant to “satisfy such other conditions 
as the court may impose.”79  The 2001 Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides 
that as an additional condition of probation it may be appropriate for a court to 
impose occupational restrictions on the defendant,80 but only if (1) a 
“reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant’s occupation . . . 
and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction,”81 and (2) the restriction 
is “reasonably necessary to protect the public” because without the restriction 
it is likely that the defendant will “continue to engage in unlawful conduct 
similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.”82  The guidelines 
further provide that should the court decide that such an occupational 
restriction is appropriate, such a restriction may only be imposed for a limited 
amount of time and to a limited extent.83  In its report on the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the 
condition “should only be used as reasonably necessary to protect the 
public.”84 
The Sixth Circuit, relying on § 5F1.5 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, upheld a condition of probation that prevented a lawyer from 
performing title search services during his probationary period.85  The lawyer 
had been convicted of using false social security numbers, and the court found 
a direct relationship between the condition and the conduct of the relevant 
offense.86  The court further found that the restriction was necessary to protect 
the public and that it met the limited scope and minimum time requirements.87 
Other cases decided by the U.S. courts of appeals can be read to state 
generally that a federal judge would not be able to order, as a condition of 
probation, that a defendant permanently surrender his or her license to practice 
 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) (2002). 
 80. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 18 U.S.C. app.  § 5B1.3(e)(4) (2001). 
 81. Id. at § 5F1.5(a)(1). 
 82. Id. at § 5F1.5(a)(2). 
 83. Id. at § 5F1.5(b) (“If the court decides to impose a condition of probation or supervised 
release restricting a defendant’s engagement in a specified occupation, business, or profession, 
the court shall impose the condition for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary 
to protect the public.”). 
 84. S. REP NO. 98-225, at 96 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.  (The 
committee’s report further explained that because the condition was not to be used “as a means of 
punishing the convicted person,” the use of the condition and its scope are limited “to the 
minimum reasonably necessary to protect the public.”). 
 85. United States v. Manogg, No. 93-3622, 1995 WL 290248 (6th Cir. May 11, 1995). 
 86. Id. at 1-2. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
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any profession,88 but would be able to order the defendant not to participate in 
the profession for the duration of the probationary period or some shorter 
period of time.89  Several of the cases relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3651, which 
provided that a judge may place a defendant “on probation for such a period 
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.”90  This section 
has since been repealed, but the language is similar to that found in 18 U.S.C. § 
3563(b)(22);91 thus the cases interpreting it are still good law.  In one such 
case, the Second Circuit held that a district court’s condition that a lawyer 
permanently resign from the bar after being convicted of filing false income 
tax returns and being placed on probation was improper.92  The court found 
that the condition needed to bear a “reasonable relationship to the treatment of 
the accused and the protection of the public.”93  The court was concerned that 
the defendant have a chance to contest the imposition of the condition and 
stated that before a defendant is required to give up his job or profession “he 
should be given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate why such a condition 
might be inappropriate.”94  The court further stated that expulsion from the bar 
is a responsibility best left to the state.95 
 
 88. Cases that have found that a court may not require a person permanently to surrender a 
license include: United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 683 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Sterber, 846 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Polk, 556 F.2d 803, 804 (6th Cir. 
1977) (holding that a district court exceeded its authority by imposing as a condition that 
defendant surrender his license to practice law).  See the discussion of Pastore, infra notes 92-95 
and accompanying text, and the discussion of Sterber, infra note 95. 
 89. Cases that have held that occupational restrictions are appropriate during the 
probationary period include: United States v. Villarin Genera, 553 F.2d 723, 726-27 (1st Cir. 
1977); United States v. Brockway, 769 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tonry, 605 
F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (violating FECA was proper justification for condition that 
defendant not run for public office or engage in public activity while on probation); United States 
v. Manogg, No. 93-3622, 1995 WL 290248, at 4 (6th Cir. May 11, 1995); see generally, United 
States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995) (violating orders prohibiting extrajudicial statements 
in violation of local rule was proper reason for barring lawyer from practicing in E.D.N.Y. for 
180 days).  See the discussion of Villarin Genera, infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text, the 
discussion of Brockway, infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text, and the discussion of 
Manogg, supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed 1984) (emphasis added). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) (2002).  See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 92. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 676-77, 683 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 93. Id. at 680. 
 94. Id. at 682. 
 95. Id. at 683 (stating that because “expulsion from the state bar is a sanction precisely 
governed by statute and regulation, it would seem preferable not to impose that sanction except 
by procedure and for the reasons prescribed.”); c.f. United States v. Sterber, 846 F.2d 842, 843 
(2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to uphold a district court’s condition that a pharmacist surrender his state 
pharmacy license after he furnished false information on a federal drug form, and stating again 
that because state law “sets forth well-defined procedures to determine whether revocation of [the 
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Several courts have dealt with the imposition of occupational restrictions 
on police officers.  The First Circuit has upheld a condition that a police officer 
resign from the police force during his probationary period.96  The officer had 
struck a private citizen numerous times and had arrested him without probable 
cause, violating 18 U.S.C. § 242.97 The court found that there was a reasonable 
relationship between the treatment of the officer and the protection of the 
public as there was a possibility that the officer might lose his temper on a 
future occasion, and limiting him to clerical duties might afford him the 
opportunity to commit unlawful administrative acts.98 Similarly, in U.S. v. 
Brockway, the Fifth Circuit upheld a condition that an elected county sheriff 
not serve as a law enforcement officer during the probationary period.99  The 
sheriff was placed on federal probation after brutalizing a pre-trial detainee to 
obtain a confession.100  The court held: “Barring from law enforcement work 
one who has demonstrated such a recurring tendency to abuse the office . . . is 
clearly reasonably related to protection of the public.”101 
The foregoing suggests that a federal judge does not have the authority to 
require that an officer permanently give up his peace officer certification as a 
condition of probation or supervised release.  Additionally, because a state is 
required to take action to decertify an officer, a condition that an officer 
relinquish his certification would ultimately result in a federal court 
impermissibly directing the state to take action.102 
It is apparent that in most cases involving civil rights violations under § 
241 and § 242 or public corruption such as perjury and extortion there is a need 
for keeping the officer out of law enforcement.  Thus, as a matter of course, the 
prosecutor should recommend to the court that the officer be prohibited from 
returning to his job during the probationary period.  This is particularly true 
because there is no guarantee that the local police agency will fire the 
employee, or that the state POST will immediately revoke the officer’s 
certificate upon conviction. 
 
defendant’s license] is an appropriate sanction and provides [the defendant] with a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the imposition of such a sanction . . . the special condition of probation was 
improper.”). 
 96. United States v. Villarin Genera, 553 F.2d 723, 724 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 727 and n.9 (explaining that while performing administrative duties the officer 
might swear out false complaints or testify falsely before a Grand Jury or at trial). 
 99. United States v. Brockway, 769 F.2d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 265. 
 102. United States v. Martinez, 988 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“[A] condition of 
federal probation that restricts a state-granted or state-established right is permissible as long as 
the condition is reasonable, is not imposed for a term greater than the duration of the probationary 
period, and does not require a state official to enforce a federal judicial order.”). 
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IV.  FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH STATE POSTS 
A. After a Conviction 
Where the federal prosecutor is successful in getting a conviction, a copy 
of the conviction should be forwarded to the state POST.103  In most states, a 
felony conviction is a ground for revocation of the license.  Conviction of 
certain misdemeanors is a ground for revocation in many states.  Since an 
officer certified in one state may seek to obtain a certificate in another state, 
information that the officer has been convicted of a crime in federal court 
should be sent to all state POSTs, even to POSTs in states that do not have the 
authority to revoke, because the conviction may prevent a person from being 
certified in the first instance.104  In the absence of a national databank on law 
enforcement officers who have lost their licenses or otherwise engaged in 
misconduct, the DOJ and IADLEST should confer on how best to get 
information on convictions to POSTs.  Perhaps the NDD105 would be the 
appropriate place for such data to be kept. 
B. After an Acquittal 
Where there is an acquittal after a federal prosecution, the state POST 
should be informed of that fact and told of the availability of trial transcripts of 
witnesses that might be helpful to the POST in deciding whether to proceed 
administratively against the officer, because some states permit revocation or 
other sanctions for reasons other than a criminal conviction.  Of course, 
transcripts from state criminal cases that result in acquittals would also be 
helpful.  Consideration should be given to regular meetings of state and federal 
prosecutors with POST personnel to share this and other information. 
 
 103. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3311 (West 2001), amended by 2002 Okla. Sess. Law 
Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West 2002) (imposing the duty on the district attorney who prosecutes 
a peace officer for a felony or crime involving moral turpitude to report pleas to the state Council 
on Law Enforcement Education and Training). 
 104. Indiana and Rhode Island, two states without revocation authority, prohibit by regulation 
entry into the police academy where an applicant has been convicted of a felony or any crime 
involving moral turpitude.  IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 250 r. 1-3-9 (WESTLAW through Aug. 9, 
2002); Facsimile from Glenford J. Shibley, R.I. Mun. Police Acad., to Roger L. Goldman, 
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law (Dec. 21, 2000) (on file with author). 
 105. See supra note 20-23 and accompanying text.  In cases of civil judgments or settlements 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving color-of-law violations by police officers, Congress should 
consider requiring payers—malpractice insurance companies or municipalities in the case of self-
insurers—to report the amount paid to the NDD and the state POST.  This is analogous to the 
requirement imposed by federal law in cases of malpractice judgments or settlements against 
health-care practitioners.  See supra note 17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] STATE REVOCATION AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION 139 
 
C. When There Is No Federal Prosecution 
As discussed above, the vast majority of complaints against law 
enforcement officers received by the federal government do not result in 
prosecution.106  While the complaint may not be deemed worthy of federal 
prosecution, it may indicate misconduct that constitutes grounds for revocation 
under state law.  In these cases the DOJ should consider adopting a policy of 
notifying the state POST of the complaint.107  Notification should also include 
transmission to the POST of both FBI investigative files and grand jury 
testimony.  While rules governing the disclosure of this information may make 
sharing problematic, there are exceptions to the rules that may enable the DOJ 
to provide POSTs with this information.  Because most state POSTs are 
understaffed, the receipt of federal investigative files and grand jury transcripts 
could be quite useful in carrying out their important task of protecting the 
public by removing the licenses of unfit officers. 
The kinds of cases appropriate for revocation but not for prosecution 
would include those in which the facts suggest the commission of a crime but 
 
 106. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
 107. Consider the incongruity presented by the fact that DOJ attorneys, like all other 
attorneys, have an obligation to inform state bar officials if they have “knowledge that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1999), but there is no duty to report misconduct of 
law enforcement officials to their corresponding disciplinary authority.  The same policy rationale 
that supports the duty to report lawyers—protection of the public—supports a practice of 
informing state POSTs, a practice that should be followed with respect to serious misconduct by 
law enforcement officials.  For a discussion of state laws requiring reporting of decertifiable 
conduct by local police departments to POSTs and providing qualified immunity for reporting 
such conduct, see Puro et al., Police Decertification: Changing Patterns Among the States, 1985-
1995, 20 Policing 481, 489-94 (1997). 
  Regarding immunity for reporting alleged misconduct, the court in Weber v. Cueto, 568 
N.E.2d 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), noted that an absolute privilege exists when a lawyer makes a 
report under Illinois Disciplinary Rule 1-103, the equivalent to Rule 8.3.  Id. at 519.  Both rules 
place an absolute duty on the lawyer to report and subject him to discipline should he fail to 
report.  Whereas Rule 8.3 requires the reporting of only serious violations, the Illinois rule 
requires the reporting of every violation.  The Weber court took guidance from several cases 
outside of Illinois which held that an absolute privilege exists where a law requires reporting.  See 
Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc. 525 F. Supp 46, 59 (D. Kan. 1981) (“When a statement is required by 
federal law, an absolute privilege must exist.”); Newman v. Legal Services, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 
535, 543 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that statements disseminated pursuant to the FOIA were 
absolutely privileged because the government was required to produce the documents); Johnson 
v. Dirkwager, 315 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. 1982) (defamatory material in employee termination letter 
was absolutely privileged where law required disclosure of defamatory material).  The Weber 
court then reasoned: “[W]e can make no meaningful distinction between the compulsion effected 
by a law enacted by the legislature and that effected by a disciplinary rule promulgated by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois.” Weber, 568 N.E.2d at 519. 
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the federal prosecutor could not show proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Some 
states permit revocation by a preponderance of the evidence,108 others by clear 
and convincing evidence.109  Some states permit revocation without regard to 
whether the action is criminal, for example, “[c]onduct which would tend to 
disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopardize public trust and fidelity in law 
enforcement.”110 
For a set of related cases, deemed worthy of prosecution but for which 
“there exists an adequate, non-criminal alternative to prosecution,”111 the 
Manual already contemplates this type of information sharing. In section 9-
27.250, Non-Criminal Alternatives to Prosecution, the Manual states that when 
considering such an alternative, “[I]t should be noted that referrals for non-
criminal disposition may not include the transfer of grand jury material unless 
an order under Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has been 
obtained.”112 
The Criminal Section statistics do not indicate how many law enforcement 
cases, if any, are referred to POSTs, nor at what point in the process these 
referrals are made.  As implied by the Manual and as discussed below, there 
may be limits on what kind of information can be shared, but there does not 
seem to be any restriction on sharing information depending on the stage of the 
investigation and prosecution process.  Therefore, even if a complaint is one of 
the approximately 5000113 annually that do not result in an FBI investigation, if 
the allegations in the complaint might constitute revocable conduct under state 
law, the POST should be informed. 
The next sections will discuss whether there may be disclosure of grand 
jury materials and whether there may be disclosure of non-grand jury 
information. 
1. Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Materials 
The common law had a “long-established policy that maintains the secrecy 
of the grand jury proceedings in federal court.”114  Rule 6(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure codified the common law policy that matters 
occurring before a grand jury should not be disclosed.  This general rule of 
 
 108. E.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119 (1999). 
 109. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.101.380(1) (West 2002). 
 110. UTAH CODE ANN. § §53-6-211(1)(d)(v) (2002); W. VA. CODE  ST. R. § 149-2-16.1 
(2001). 
 111. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-27.250(B). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Only about 1000 investigations are initiated from the approximately 6000 complaints 
received against police officers annually by the Criminal Section.  Thus, about 5000 complaints 
are received and not investigated.  See supra notes 26-27. 
 114. U.S. v. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983). 
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secrecy undoubtedly includes “all testimony, legal instructions, prosecution 
remarks, and any other statements given before the grand jury.”115  Yet, Rule 
6(e) has two exceptions that may be applicable to the current situation: 
6(e)(3)(C)(i) first provides that that “disclosure . . . of matters occurring before 
the grand jury may also be made when so directed by a court preliminary to or 
in connection with a judicial proceeding.”116  A second exception to the rule 
provides that disclosure may be made “when permitted by a court at the 
request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters 
may disclose a violation of State criminal law, to an appropriate official of a 
State or subdivision of a State for the purpose of enforcing such law.”117 
a. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) 
The first exception requires the party seeking disclosure to prove that the 
materials will be used “preliminary to or in a judicial proceeding.”118  The 
Supreme Court has also said that there must be a “strong showing of 
particularized need for grand jury materials. . . .”119 
The major problem in applying this rule is determining what constitutes a 
judicial proceeding or a matter preliminary to a judicial proceeding.  Generally, 
disclosure is permitted in connection with federal, state and local court 
proceedings.120  In addition, grand jury proceedings are deemed to be 
“preliminary to” criminal court proceedings, and therefore disclosure is 
allowed for use in federal and state grand jury proceedings.121 
Other uses for these materials, however, are not so clear, but over the years 
courts have established some guidelines.  In United States v. Baggot, the 
Supreme Court stated that the rule “contemplates only uses related fairly 
directly to some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated.”122  The Court 
further noted that it is “not enough to show that some litigation may emerge 
from the matter in which the material is to be used, or even that litigation is 
 
 115. PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §10.01 (1991 
Supp.) The book notes, however, that Rule 6(e) does not apply to ministerial grand jury records 
or to “individual documents subpoenaed by the grand jury.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Exceptions to 
this rule are documents that might contain information relating to the strategy or direction of the 
grand jury investigation, as well as Department of Justice memoranda submitted to the grand jury. 
Id. 
 116. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
 117. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV). 
 118. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
 119. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983); see also 1 SARA 
BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5:9-5:10 (2d ed. 1997). 
 120. BEALE ET AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-58. 
 121. Id. 
 122. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983). 
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factually likely to emerge.”123  Instead, the Court held: “[t]he focus is on the 
actual use to be made of the material.  If the primary purpose of disclosure is 
not to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure . . . is 
not permitted.”124  In Baggot, the Court held that disclosure of grand jury 
materials for use in an IRS audit of civil tax liability was not allowed under the 
rule, making it clear that agency proceedings would often not qualify for 
disclosure.125  The reason for the Court’s decision was that the focus of the 
IRS’s actions was “to perform the non-litigative function of assessing taxes 
rather than to prepare for or to conduct litigation.”126  Therefore, the Court held 
that these actions were not preliminary to a judicial proceeding.127 
The issue of whether a proceeding qualifies under the rule as either 
preliminary to a judicial proceeding or as an actual judicial proceeding is often 
contested.  However, there is a general consensus among courts that both state 
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys or judges and local disciplinary 
proceedings against police officers constitute judicial proceedings or matters 
preliminary to judicial proceedings for purposes of the rule.128 
In In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, the Seventh Circuit 
permitted disclosure to a police superintendent who summoned five police 
officers to appear before the Chicago Police Department’s Board of Inquiry.129  
The officers had earlier appeared before a criminal grand jury investigating 
allegations of conspiracy and corruption.130  The superintendent sought the 
grand jury minutes and testimony of the court reporters in order to conduct an 
investigation into allegations that the officers violated departmental rules.131  
The court allowed disclosure on the basis that the police board hearing was 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 125. Id.; see also BEALE ET AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-59. 
 126. Baggot, 463 U.S. at 483; see also BEALE AT AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-60. 
 127. Baggot, 463 U.S. at 483; see also BEALE AT AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-60.  The 
court did not suggest, however, that a taxpayer contesting a tax liability in court would not be a 
judicial proceeding.  To the contrary, the court seemed to suggest that this would be a judicial 
proceeding for purposes of the rule.  Baggot, 463 U.S. at 481. 
 128. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-60, n.17 (citing United States v. 
Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764 (2nd cir. 1980) (attorney disciplinary proceedings); In re Disclosure of 
Testimony Before Grand Jury, Troia, 580 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1980), aff’g United States v. 
Salinitro, 437 F.Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1977) (commission on judicial qualifications); In re 
Holovachka, 317 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1963) (police board of inquiry); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 
118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958) (attorney disciplinary proceeding); In Re Petition to Inspect Grand Jury 
Materials, 576 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (judicial disciplinary panel); and In Re Grand Jury 
Transcripts, 309 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (police board of inquiry)). 
 129. In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 130. Id. at 895. 
 131. Id. 
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preliminary to a judicial proceeding.132 The court’s rationale was that the 
statutory scheme gave the police officers a right to judicial review of their case 
should the board choose to impose a penalty on them.133  The court also noted 
that the “purpose of rule 6(e) is to facilitate efficient adjudication for the 
protection of the public.”134  The court continued: “Certainly, the release of 
grand jury testimony to a police board seeking to prevent those who may be 
perpetrators of crime from clothing themselves in the trappings of the law can 
only redound to the protection of the public with whom such figures of 
authority come into contact.”135 
Conlisk involved a local disciplinary proceeding rather than a state 
revocation proceeding, which is more analogous to a state bar disciplinary 
proceedings, seeking to disbar a lawyer.  Since courts have permitted 
disclosure of federal grand jury materials for state bar proceedings,136 the 
outcome should be no different for a state POST requesting disclosure for a 
police license revocation proceeding.  Furthermore, the statutory scheme in 
Conlisk is similar to revocation statutes in that both allow officers to seek 
judicial review of the administrative decision.  Therefore, since the procedures 
in Conlisk were deemed preliminary to a judicial proceeding, the same could 
hold true for a POST revocation proceeding.137 
b. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV) 
Although courts have held that police officer disciplinary proceedings 
constitute matters preliminary to judicial proceedings, one problem that 
sometimes arises is that state authorities are not aware of the facts developed in 
 
 132. Id. at 897. 
 133. Id. at 896-97.  The Illinois statutory scheme provided that the officers could seek judicial 
review in the Circuit Court, with an appeal as of right to the Appellate Court of Illinois.  Id. at 
896. 
 134. Id. at 898. 
 135. Id. at 897. 
 136. See Baggot, supra note 122; see generally BEALE ET AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9 (citing 
many cases in which the Rule 6(e) determination has been made). 
 137. In order to obtain materials under this exception, the POST would file a petition for 
disclosure “in the district where the grand jury convened.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D); see also 
DIAMOND, supra note 115, at 10-18.  Written notice of the petition for disclosure must be given 
to the prosecutor, the parties to the proceeding, and “such other persons as the court may direct.”  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D); see also DIAMOND, supra note 115, at 10-18.  Prior to granting the 
petition, the parties given notice will be allowed an opportunity to be heard on the subject.  FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E); see also DIAMOND, supra note 115, at 10-18.  In the case of a POST 
requesting this information, it seems that the interest of protecting the public would most likely 
outweigh the general rule of grand jury secrecy, and disclosure would be available under the 
6(e)(C)(i) exception. 
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the federal investigation.138  If this is the case, state authorities may be unable 
to prove that they have a particularized need for the information or that 
proceedings are even contemplated.139  In this situation, the state agency will 
not qualify for disclosure under 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
In 1985, however, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 6(e) to include 
subdivision 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV), which allows disclosure of grand jury material if 
authorized by the court after the request of a government attorney.  With 
respect to the problem presented by the requirement that the state to show a 
particularized need, the Advisory Committee notes stated: “This inability 
lawfully to disclose evidence of a state criminal violation—evidence 
legitimately obtained by the grand jury—constitutes an unreasonable barrier to 
the effective enforcement of our two-tiered system of criminal laws.”140  The 
committee also noted: “It is clearly desirable that federal and state authorities 
cooperate.”141 
With respect to the Advisory Committee comments the Manual remarks: 
“It is both the intent of the amended rule, and the policy of the Department of 
Justice, to share grand jury information wherever it is appropriate to do so.”142  
The Manual lists some requirements for disclosure under the rule.  First, 
disclosure may be made to “any official whose official duties include 
enforcement of the State criminal law whose violation is indicated in the 
matters for which disclosure authorization is sought.”143  Second, the Manual 
requires that prior to a request to a court for disclosure, the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Division having jurisdiction over the matter must give 
authorization.144  Authorization should only be given when there exits a 
substantial need to support the disclosure.145 
 
 138. BEALE ET AL., supra note 119, at § 5:9, at 5-56 to 5-57. 
 139. Id. at § 5:9, at 5-57.  Beale noted that the Advisory Committee’s Note in support of the 
amendment “observed that information developed in a federal grand jury proceeding often arises 
outside the context of any pending or contemplated state court proceeding and under current 
provisions could not be disclosed. . . .” Id. at n.8. 
 140. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 Advisory Committee Notes. 
 141. Id. 
 142. USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-11.260. 
 143. Id. 
 144. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, sec. 157 (Oct. 1997), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00157.htm.  The Manual 
provides that a request for authorization must be made in writing and must include all of the 
information required by the Resource Manual 157.  In making the decision whether to give 
authorization, an AAG will consider, inter alia, whether:  “(1) The State has a substantial need 
for the information; (2) The grand jury was convened for a legitimate Federal investigative 
purpose; (3) Disclosure would impair an ongoing Federal trial or investigation; (4) Disclosure 
would violate a federal statute (e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6103) or regulation; (5) Disclosure would violate 
a specific Departmental policy; (6) Disclosure would reveal classified information to persons 
without an appropriate security clearance; (7) Disclosure would compromise the government’s 
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This exception appears to be broader than the first exception because there 
is no requirement for the POST to show a “particularized need,” but there must 
only be shown a substantial need for the materials, and there is no requirement 
that disclosure under this rule be in connection with a judicial proceeding.146  
The problem is that the wording of Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(i)(IV) is quite narrow, 
applying only when a state prosecution is contemplated.  The Advisory 
Committee or Congress should consider expanding the exception to permit 
disclosure of grand jury information to professional licensing agencies, like 
POSTs, where there is evidence of misconduct that constitutes grounds for 
revocation under state law.147 The countervailing argument is that sharing such 
information would chill potential grand jury witnesses, particularly law 
enforcement officers who risk ostracism were it known that they testified 
before a grand jury against a fellow officer. 
2. Disclosure of Other Material 
Other investigative materials compiled by the federal government should 
also be shared with state POSTs when there is substantial evidence that a law 
enforcement officer has engaged in serious misconduct, albeit not a federal 
crime.  The kinds of materials sought would include FBI interviews with the 
officer, victim, or witnesses, any records obtained, such as medical records, 
photographs, and financial records, if the case involved public integrity 
matters.  This information could be extremely useful to POST personnel; 
however, federal law generally makes this information non-discoverable.148 
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966149 (“FOIA”) provided “for 
disclosure to the public of records, files, and other information of federal 
departments and agencies in the executive branch.”150  Yet, there are 
exceptions to the general rule that when documents are requested they should 
be disclosed, most importantly § 552(b)(7), which provides: 
 
ability to protect an informant; (8) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets; and (9) 
Reasonable alternative means exist for obtaining the information.”  Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. While there is no requirement to show the court that the state has a “particularized need,” 
DOJ policy does require approval of the request to the court by the “Assistant Attorney General 
in charge of the Division having jurisdiction over the matters that were presented to the grand 
jury.”  USAM, supra note 39, at § 9-11.260, see also DIAMOND, supra note 115, at § 10.03[E], at 
10-26 (“The Department will not require “particularized,” but only “substantial,” need for the 
disclosure.” (citing § 9-11.260 (1992-1 Supp.)). 
 147. Note that Congress has recently amended the rule to permit sharing of information 
among federal agencies concerning terrorists.  USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 
Stat 272, 279 (2001); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V). 
 148. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text. 
 149. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
 150. USAM, supra note 39, at § 3-17.100. 
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[the Act] does not apply to records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right 
to a fair trial .  .  . , (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . , (E) would disclose 
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions . 
. . , or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety 
of any individual.151 
If POST personnel were to seek information, they would most likely be 
seeking “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” as 
addressed by § 552(b)(7).  None of the circumstances listed as exceptions in § 
552(b)(7)(A)–(F) seem applicable in a typical revocation case, and therefore 
such information should be subject to disclosure under the FOIA upon the 
filing of a request with the component of the Department of Justice that 
maintains the records. 152 
The FOIA must be read in conjunction with the Privacy Act of 1974 
(“PA”).153 POST officials need to be aware of the PA rules as well as the 
procedures for obtaining disclosure.  The PA provides: “No agency shall 
disclose any record . . . unless disclosure would be . . . required under section 
552 of this title.”154  Therefore, if disclosure is required under the FOIA, 
meaning none of the exemptions to disclosure applies, then the PA does not 
prevent disclosure.155 
 
 151. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
 152. USAM, supra note 39, at § 3-17.120; see 28 C.F.R. § 16.3 (West, WESTLAW, current 
through Oct. 1, 2002).  The request should be in writing and must contain a detailed description 
of the records.  28 C.F.R. § 16.3.  Generally, the component of the Department first receiving the 
request is responsible for responding.  Id. at § 16.4(a). The head of that component has the 
authority to grant or deny the request. Id. at § 16.4(b).  This portion of the regulation also notes 
the following: “Whenever a request is made for a record containing information that relates to an 
investigation of a possible violation of law and was originated by another component or agency, 
the receiving component shall refer the responsibility for responding to the request regarding that 
information to that other component or agency or consult with that other component or agency.” 
Id. at § 16.4(d).  The component has twenty business days from the time a request is received to 
make a determination to grant or deny the request.  Id. at § 16.6(b).  The person requesting the 
information will be notified in writing and will receive the documents if disclosure is granted.  Id.  
If a request is denied, it may be appealed under 28 C.F.R. § 16.9.  Id. at § 16.6(c)(4). 
 153. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
 154. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994). 
 155. The Office of Information and Privacy (“OIP”), advises the Department “on questions of 
policy relating to the interpretation and application of the [FOIA].” USAM, supra note 39, at § 3-
17.121.  Although the Code of Federal Regulations addresses requests made for disclosure of 
records under the PA, the procedure is the same as that under the FOIA.  28 C.F.R. 16.48 (West, 
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Federal regulations also provide rules for situations in which DOJ 
employees are asked to testify or to produce documents in response to 
demands or subpoenas of courts issued in state or federal proceedings.156  The 
general rule in this situation is that “no present or former employee of the 
Department of Justice may testify or produce Departmental records . . . issued 
in any state or federal proceeding without obtaining prior approval by an 
appropriate Department official.”157 
Additionally, provisions in the Civil Rights Resource Manual govern the 
response to a request for disclosure of information collected by the Civil 
Rights Division.158  The power to authorize disclosure of such information is 
vested in the United States Attorney for the district in which the demand 
originated.159  Generally, the Department “favors cooperation in state and 
federal cases in which the testimony of one of its employees is sought or in 
which information obtained by the Department is sought.”160  The regulations 
do list possible factors, similar to some of those listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) 
(the FOIA), that lead to denial of such requests.161  But even if these factors are 
present, an official may still authorize disclosure if the “administration of 
justice” requires it.162  As opposed to records requests, when FBI agents who 
have conducted investigations in connection with a Criminal Section case are 
subpoenaed to testify in state or federal proceedings, the DOJ’s policy is to 
 
WESTLAW, current through Oct. 1, 2002).  The OIP serves as the reviewing authority for 
appeals of FOIA decisions by components of the DOJ. See USAM, supra note 39, at § 3-17.121.  
An appeal must be made within 30 days after receipt of the Department’s determination.  See 28 
C.F.R. 16.48(a); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , EOUSA RESOURCE MANUAL, sec. 138 (1997). 
 156. 28 C.F.R. § 16.21-.29 (West, WESTLAW, current through Oct. 1, 2002); see USAM, 
supra note 39, at § 1-6.210. 
 157. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 (West, WESTLAW, current through Oct. 1, 2002); see also USAM, 
supra note 39, at § 1-6.100.  Information regulated includes: (1) material contained in the files of 
the Department; (2) information relating to materials contained in the Department’s files; and (3) 
information acquired by a Department employee as part of that employee’s official duties or 
because of that employee’s official status.  28 C.F.R. § 16.22. 
 158. CRRM, supra note 29, at sec. 48, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title8/cvr00047.htm. 
 159. 28 C.F.R. § 16.22, supra note 156; see also USAM, supra note 39, at § 1-6.240.  In Civil 
Rights Division cases, the US Attorney must contact the Deputy AAG of the Division who refers 
the matter to the Section chief.  CRRM, supra note 29, at sec. 48, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ 
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title8/cvr00047.htm. 
 160. USAM, supra note 39, at § 1-6.240. 
 161. 28 C.F.R. § 16.26(b) (2001); USAM, supra note 39, at § 1-6.240 (stating that a denial is 
not usually permitted unless one of the six factors in § 16.26(b) is present). 
 162. USAM, supra note 39, at § 1-6.440 (indicating that the Deputy Attorney General or the 
Associate Attorney General has authority to order disclosure despite the presence of one of the 
following factors: (1) seriousness of the violation or the crime; (2) past history of violator; (3) 
importance of relief sought; (4) importance of legal issues presented; and (5) any other matters). 
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resist the subpoena unless the agent can give eyewitness testimony.163  The 
Manual notes that “[q]uite often the subpoena is issued on behalf of a state 
defendant in a criminal case seeking to obtain the results of an FBI 
investigation into alleged police mistreatment of the defendant.”164  It is 
unlikely that a state POST would need to subpoena an FBI agent to testify in a 
revocation proceeding; it is the agent’s investigative file that would be sought. 
V.  IMPLEMENTING COOPERATION 
One way to initiate the relatively intensive cooperation suggested above 
would be to convene a meeting between the national organization of POST 
directors (IADLEST), members of the Criminal Section, and representatives of 
the US Attorneys, followed by a meeting of each US Attorney, FBI 
investigators, and the POST Director in each state with a revocation program.  
In these meetings, each side could get a better understanding of what the other 
does, what their needs are, and what the existing barriers are to better 
cooperation.  Task forces could be formed, as is currently being done in the 
area of health care fraud and abuse, between the DOJ, other federal agencies, 
and state and local agencies.165 A possible model is set forth in the proposed 
Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 2000,166 which would establish a 
federal task force composed of ten individuals from such DOJ components as 
the Criminal Section, COPS, and the Special Litigation Section whose duties 
would be to coordinate “investigative, prosecutorial, and enforcement efforts 
of Federal, state, local and Indian tribal Governments in cases related to law 
enforcement misconduct” as well as to “consult with professional law 
enforcement associations . . . labor organizations, and community-based 
organizations . . . to coordinate the process of the detection and referral of 
complaints regarding incidents of alleged law enforcement misconduct.”167  
POST Directors, through IADLEST, should be included in the groups with 
whom the task force consults. 
Pending a decision on the extent of cooperation between DOJ officials and 
state POSTs, the DOJ should undertake an examination of the law enforcement 
data from complaints that have not resulted in federal prosecution: 
 
 163. Id. at §8-3.180. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL sec. 983 (1998), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/fioa_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00983.htm. (“Federal, State, 
local or regional health care fraud task forces/working groups can improve health care fraud 
enforcement by encouraging communication and coordination among law enforcement officials 
in the use of criminal, civil, and/or administrative remedies.  Successful resolution of these cases 
and operation of the task forces depends on mutual cooperation.”). 
 166. H.R. 3981, 106th Cong. § 801 (2000). 
 167. Id. at § 801(c). 
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approximately 80,000 complaints, and approximately 25,000 FBI 
investigations and grand jury proceedings that did not return an indictment.168  
These files should be examined to get an understanding of the kinds of cases 
that are not pursued at the federal level, the reasons for lack of federal 
prosecution, and what percentage are likely to present a strong case for state 
revocation.  There should be a follow-up on cases in which the DOJ deferred to 
the state for prosecution to determine how many actually were prosecuted by 
the state.  Additionally, an analysis should be pursued to determine where 
complaints are originating: in which states, from what geographic and 
demographic areas (e.g., rural or urban), etc.  Currently, there are no data to 
determine how many of the cases are frivolous or meritorious from the 
perspective of POST revocation.  It is fair to say that thousands of hours have 
been expended by federal investigators and prosecutors on cases that are never 
pursued and we should try to learn something from that experience. 
Should it be determined that many of the cases neither prosecuted by the 
DOJ nor referred to the states for prosecution do involve revocable offenses, 
current restrictions on POSTs’ gaining access to federal records involving law 
enforcement officers should be abandoned. To the extent the Manual, federal 
rules, and federal statutes do not permit such sharing, consideration should be 
given to amending them.169  To the extent that current law requires POST staff, 
who may be unaware of the federal activity, to request the information from 
federal sources, consideration should be given to federal officials’ at least 
notifying the appropriate POST of the existence of colorable claims of 
revocable offenses. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 168. The total number of complaints in the years 1985-2001, rounded to the nearest 100, is 
164,400.  SUMMARY, supra note 26.  Making the assumption that half are against law 
enforcement officers, id., results in an estimated 82,200 complaints against law enforcement 
officers.  The total number of FBI investigations in the years 1985-2001, rounded to the nearest 
100, is 51,000.  SUMMARY, supra note 26.  Making the assumption that half of the investigations 
are of law enforcement officers, Police Brutality, supra note 27, results in an estimated 25,500 
complaints against law enforcement officers.  It was stated above that of these only a small 
fraction, possibly 2%, results in prosecution.  See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
 169. Note that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has 
amended Rule 6(e)(3)(C) by permitting the sharing of grand jury information concerning 
intelligence matters with certain federal officials.  USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §203, 
115 Stat 272, 279 (2001).  The House passed a bill that would extend the sharing of similar 
information with state and local officials.  Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, H.R. 
4598, 107th Cong. § 6 (2002) (referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 27, 
2002).  This bill was not reported out of the Senate Committee during the 107th Congress.  See 
THOMAS, supra note 19.  Congress has authorized the FBI to share “rap sheets” with state and 
local officials, among others.  28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) (Matthew Bender 2001). 
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Each year approximately 5900 complaints against law enforcement 
officers’ conduct are received by the DOJ and deemed not worthy of federal 
prosecution.170  Certainly some of these complaints present facts for which 
there is sufficient evidence to lead to revocation of the accused officer’s 
license to serve.  Revocation can occur only if the state POSTs become 
involved.  Undoubtedly, some of these complaints do come to the attention of 
the POSTs, but this article suggests that for the protection of the public the 
system for handling complaints against law enforcement officers should be 
enhanced so that more of these complaints are brought to the attention of state 
POSTs.  To achieve this goal, this article suggests two primary avenues of 
cooperation between the DOJ and the state POSTs, but notes this cooperation 
may require a new approach to, and possibly even amendment of, DOJ 
guidelines, federal regulations and federal statutes. 
The suggested cooperation involves communication in both directions 
between the DOJ and state POSTs.  First, AUSAs and Criminal Section 
attorneys should become familiar with the revocation law in the state in which 
the defendant officer is licensed so that the attorney is mindful of revocation as 
an alternative or a supplement to federal prosecution when the defendant is 
charged, when plea negotiations take place, and when sentencing occurs.  Such 
familiarity with state laws, rules, and procedures may be assisted by 
communications to the DOJ by POST personnel.  Second, federal prosecutors 
should share as much information with POSTs as possible, including the fact 
that convictions have been obtained,171 the relevant parts of trial transcripts 
regardless of whether a conviction was obtained, investigative materials 
collected by FBI agents, and grand jury transcripts.  This sort of cooperation is 
a significant undertaking, but models exist for achieving it. 
In the past decade, state POSTs have shown that they are serious about 
professionalizing law enforcement by removing unfit officers; the DOJ has 
long been concerned with combating police misconduct, and citizens have the 
right to expect they will not be subject to abuse by law enforcement officers.  
Particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
 
 170. Of the 6000 criminal, civil rights complaints received by the Criminal Section each year 
against law enforcement officers, about 100 are prosecuted, leaving 5900 that are not.  See supra 
notes 26 and 28. 
 171. Regarding the sharing of the fact of conviction, the ABA model rules on lawyer 
discipline require that state courts report convictions of lawyers to the appropriate disciplinary 
agency.  ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 19(A) (1999), 
reprinted in AM. BAR ASS’N/BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L 
CONDUCT § 01:618 (2002) (“The clerk of any court in this state in which a lawyer is found guilty 
of a crime shall within [ten] days after the finding of guilt transmit a certified copy of proof of the 
finding of guilt to counsel for the lawyer disciplinary agency of every state in which the lawyer is 
admitted to practice.”). 
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there have been efforts at federal-state-local cooperation in the area of law 
enforcement.  To support the goals and concerns of all parties involved—state 
POSTs, the DOJ, and the public—those cooperative efforts should extend to 
practices relating to the revocation of the licenses of law enforcement officers 
who are clearly unfit to serve. 
 
